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1. Introduction 
In the standard theory of decision making under uncertainty, it is assumed that the agent’s preference 
functional is deterministic. This assumption is maintained in most of the recent theoretical and 
empirical literature. It has been recognized for some time, however, that even in seemingly identical 
repetitions (replications) of the same choice setting, the decision maker often makes different choices, 
cf. Tversky (1969). This means that the deterministic theory cannot be applied directly in an empirical 
context unless some additional stochastic “error” is introduced. As Fishburn (1976, 1978), Hey (1995), 
Carbone (1997), Loomes and Sugden (1995, 1998) and Starmer (2000) discuss, this raises the question 
of how axiomatization of theories for choice under uncertainty should be extended to accommodate 
stochastic error. 
 This paper proposes an axiomatic foundation of probabilistic models for risky choice 
experiments that may be viewed, in part, as a generalization of the von Neumann–Morgenstern 
expected utility theory. This setting means that the agent’s choice behavior in replications of choice 
settings (with uncertain outcomes) is assumed to be governed by a probability mechanism. The 
motivation for this generalization is twofold. First, it is of interest to establish a probabilistic 
framework that is justified on theoretical grounds and that can be used in microeconometric empirical 
analysis of choice behavior under uncertainty. Apart from a few rather particular cases, no such 
framework seems to be available. Second, it is of independent theoretical interest to extend the von 
Neumann–Morgenstern theory to allow for errors in the decision process of the agents. There is a huge 
literature on stochastic choice models with certain outcomes; see, for example, chapter 2 in Anderson, 
Palma and Thisse (1992) and Fishburn (1998) for reviews of discrete choice models. In fact, it was 
empirical observations of inconsistencies, dating back to Thurstone (1927a,b), that led to the study of 
probabilistic theories in the first place. Thurstone argued that one reason for observed inconsistent 
choice behavior is bounded rationality in the sense that the agent is viewed as having difficulties with 
assessing the precise value (to him or her) of the choice objects. Whereas probabilistic models for 
certain outcomes have been studied and applied extensively in psychology and economics, it seems 
that there has been less interest in developing corresponding models for choice with uncertain 
outcomes. (For a summary of models with uncertain outcomes, see Fishburn (1998) and Starmer 
(2000, Section 6.2).) This is somewhat curious, as one would expect that if an agent has problems with 
rank ordering alternatives with certain outcomes, he or she would most certainly find it difficult to 
choose among lotteries. 
 The importance of developing theoretically justified stochastic choice models for 
uncertain outcomes has been articulated by Harless and Camerer (1994) and Hey and Orme (1994). 
For example, Hey and Orme summarize their view as follows: 
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 “... we are tempted to conclude by saying that our study indicates that behavior can be reasonably well 
modeled (to what might be termed a ‘reasonable approximation’) as ‘Expected utility plus noise’. 
Perhaps we should now spend some time thinking about the noise, rather than about even more 
alternatives to expected utility?” (pp. 1321–1322) 
 In this paper, we first consider models for choice among lotteries with “minimal 
structure” that are not analogous to von Neumann–Morgenstern’s expected utility theory.1 We restate 
axioms known from the theoretical literature on probabilistic choice, which are known as Order-
independence, Balance conditions, the Quadruple condition and the Independence from Irrelevant 
alternative condition (IIA). From Order-independence and Balance conditions, it follows that the 
binary choice probabilities are simply scalable (Tversky, 1972), and that the scale is a functional of the 
lottery outcome probabilities. 
 From the Quadruple and Balance conditions, combined with a particular regularity 
condition, it follows by an extension of Debreu’s result (cf. Debreu, 1958), that the binary choice 
probabilities can be represented as a Fechnerian model. That is, there exists a suitable utility 
functional of lottery outcome probabilities such that the binary choice probabilities can be expressed 
as a symmetric cumulative distribution functional of the respective utility differences. Subsequently, 
we consider the multinomial case where the agent faces a choice set of several lotteries. In this case, 
we apply different combinations of the axioms mentioned above together with IIA. In this context, IIA 
yields a Luce model where the utility of a lottery is a general functional of the lottery outcome 
probabilities associated with this lottery. The IIA axiom implies that there exists a scale functional 
(utility) of the lottery outcome probabilities such that the choice probabilities can be expressed as a 
multinomial logit model in terms of the utilities (Luce, 1959). 
 Next, we consider a generalization of the Expected Utility theory. We propose axioms 
that can be viewed as a probabilistic version of the so-called Archimedean Axiom, and two of the 
axioms can be viewed as probabilistic versions of the Independence Axiom in the von Neumann–
Morgenstern theory of expected utility. These probabilistic versions extend the basic von Neumann–
Morgenstern axioms in the following sense: whereas the Archimedean and Independence Axioms may 
not necessarily hold in a single-choice experiment, the probabilistic versions state that they will hold 
in an aggregate sense (to be made precise below) when the agent participates in a large number of 
replications of a choice experiment. The intuition is that the agent may be boundedly rational and 
make errors when he or she evaluates the value to him or her of the respective choice alternatives 
(strategies) in each single replication of the experiment, but on average (across replications of the 
experiment), the agent shows no systematic departure from the von Neumann–Morgenstern type of 
axioms. Alternatively, the probabilistic axioms may be conveniently interpreted in the context of an 
                                                     
1 Most of the results presented in this paper have appeared previously in Dagsvik (2005). However, some results are new, the 
presentation of results have been reorganized and errors have been corrected. 
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observationally homogeneous population of agents that face the same choice experiment. Whereas 
each agent’s behavior is allowed to deviate from the von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms, the 
“aggregate” behavior in the population is assumed to be consistent with these axioms. The latter type 
of interpretation is analogous to the most common one within the theory of discrete choice (see, for 
example, McFadden, 1981, 1984). 
 Next, we demonstrate that different combinations of the probabilistic Archimedean and 
Independence Axioms, combined with other additional axioms, imply particular characterizations of 
the probabilities for choice among risky prospects as a function of the lottery outcome probabilities. 
 As a particular case within our generalized Expected Utility theory, we study settings 
with monetary rewards. What distinguishes this case from the general situation is that the outcomes 
(money) are realizations of an ordered variable. Accordingly, it is possible to use this property to 
obtain additional characterization of the model. The (additional) axiom that yields this characterization 
states the following: if the probability of preferring lottery one over lottery two is less than the 
probability of preferring lottery three over lottery four, this inequality remains true when all outcomes 
are rescaled by the same factor while the lottery outcome probabilities remain unchanged. 
 In an empirical context, the choice probabilities implied by the proposed axioms in this 
paper are essential for establishing the link between theory and the corresponding empirical model. 
More precisely, the agents’ choices among lotteries are, from a statistical point of view, outcomes of a 
multinomial experiment with probabilities equal to the respective choice probabilities mentioned 
above. Accordingly, when the structure of the choice probabilities has been obtained, one can, in the 
context of empirical analysis, apply standard inference methods such as maximum likelihood 
estimation procedures and likelihood ratio tests. 
 The first work on stochastic models for choice among lotteries occurred in the 1960s. 
Becker et al. (1963) proposed a probabilistic model for choice among lotteries, which they called a 
Luce Model for Wagers. Luce and Suppes (1965) considered a special case of the Luce model for 
wagers, which they called the Strict Expected Utility Model. However, neither these authors nor more 
recent contributions discuss the issue of deriving a stochastic model from axiomatization. To the best 
of our knowledge, the only contribution that provides a model founded on an axiomatic basis is by 
Fishburn (1978), who develops the incremental expected utility advantage model. However, his model 
does not contain the expected utility model as a special case, although the expected utility model can 
be approximated by an incremental expected utility advantage model. As pointed out by Fishburn 
(1978, pp. 635–636), the incremental advantage model seems extreme as it implies that there is a 
positive probability of choosing $1 in a choice between $1 for certain or a gamble that yields $10 000 
with probability .999 or $0 with probability .001. 
 Allais (1953) argued that individuals may systematically violate the expected utility 
theory. His examples have later been viewed as special cases of phenomena called the common 
consequence effect and the common ratio effect. It is interesting that the stochastic version of the 
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expected utility theory developed here in fact allows for the common consequence and the common 
ratio effects. 
 The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present some basic concepts 
and notation. In Section 3, we discuss different types of axiomatizations and characterizations for 
binary choice models with “minimal structure”. In Section 4, we consider the generalization of the 
Expected Utility theory. In Section 5, we specialize to the case with monetary rewards, and in Section 
6, we discuss a random utility representation. In Section 7, we show that the models developed are 
able to rationalize the common consequence effect and the common ratio effect. Finally, we discuss an 
example in Section 8. 
2. Preliminaries 
The aim of this section is to introduce axioms that enable us to characterize choice among lotteries 
when some randomness is present in the agent’s choice behavior in the sense that if he or she faces 
several replications of a specific choice experiment, then he or she may choose different lotteries each 
time. The reason for this type of inconsistent behavior may be, as mentioned above, that the agent has 
difficulties with evaluating the proper value (to him or her) of the respective lotteries. 
 Let X denote the set that indexes the set of outcomes, which is assumed to be finite and to 
contain m outcomes, i.e., { }X 1,2,...,m≡ . In the following, we shall assume, as is customary, that the 
agent’s information about the chances of the different realizations of lottery s can be represented by 
lottery outcome probabilities 
 ( )s s s sg : g (1),g (2),...,g (m)= , 
where gs(k) is the probability of outcome k, k X∈ ,  if lottery s is chosen. Let S denote the set of 
simple probability measures on the algebra of all subsets of the set of outcomes. Recall that a 
preference relation refers to a binary relation, f% , on S that is: (i) complete, i.e., for all gr, sg S∈  either 
r sg gf%  or s rg gf% ; and (ii) transitive, i.e., for all gr, gs, gt, in S, r sg gf%  and s tg gf%  implies r tg gf% . A 
real-valued function ( )sL g  on S represents f%  if for all gr, sg S∈ , r sg gf% , if and only if 
( ) ( )r sL g L g≥ . Let B  be the family of finite subsets of S that contain at least two elements. 
 Consider now the following choice setting. The agent faces n replications of a choice 
experiment in which a set B of lotteries, B∈B , is presented in each replication. We assume that there 
is no learning. As there is an element of randomness in the agent’s choice behavior, he or she may 
choose different lotteries in different replications. We assume that the agent’s choices in different 
replications are stochastically independent. Let ( )B s sP g , g B,∈  be the probability that gs is the most 
preferred vector of lottery outcome probabilities in B. Let ( )r sP g ,g  be the probability that lottery gr is 
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chosen over gs, i.e., ( ) { } ( )r sr s rg ,gP g ,g P g≡ . It then follows that ( ) ( )r s s rP g ,g P g ,g>  if and only if 
( )r sP g ,g 0.5> . The argument above provides a motivation for the following definition. 
 
 Definition 1 
 For r sg ,g S∈ , lottery gr is said to be strictly preferred to gs in the aggregate sense, if 
and only if ( )r sP g ,g 0.5 .>  If ( )r sP g ,g 0.5,=  then gr is, in the aggregate sense, indifferent to gs. 
 
 Thus, Definition 1 introduces a binary relation, f% , where r sg gf  means that gr is strictly 
preferred to gs (in the aggregate sense), whereas gr ~ gs means that gr is indifferent to gs. Note, 
however, that the relation is not necessarily a preference relation. The reason for this is that the binary 
relation f%  is not necessarily transitive. That is, for 1 2 3g ,g ,g S∈ , the statement that ( )1 2P g ,g 0.5≥  
and ( )2 3P g ,g 0.5≥  imply ( )1 3P g ,g 0.5≥  is not necessarily true. 
 Let 1 2g ,g S∈ . The mixed lottery, ( ) [ ]1 2g 1 g , 0,1α + − α α∈ , is a lottery in S yielding the 
probability ( )1 2g (k) 1 g (k)α + − α  of outcome k, k X∈ . Here, we assume that the agents perceive the 
lotteries ( )1 2g 1 gαβ + − αβ  and ( ) ( )1 2 2g 1 g 1 gβ ⎡α + − α ⎤+ − β⎣ ⎦ , [ ]α β, ,∈ 0 1  as equivalent. This 
property is known as the axiom of reduction of compound lotteries, cf. Luce and Raiffa (1957). 
 For sets, A,B∈B such that A B⊆ , let 
  ( ) ( )
s
B B s
g A
P A P g .
∈
≡ ∑  
The interpretation is that PB(A) is the probability that the agent will choose a lottery within A when B 
is the choice set. 
3. Probabilistic models with minimal structure 
In this section, we shall consider models that are not necessarily extensions of the von Neumann–
Morgenstern expected utility theory. We start by introducing behavioral axioms, which will lead to 
different types of characterizations of the choice probabilities. 
 
 Axiom 1 (Order-independence) 
 For all 1 2 3g ,g ,g S∈  
(i) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 3 2 31P g ,g if and only if P g ,g P g ,g2≥ ≥ ; 
(ii) the Balance condition: ( ) ( )1 2 2 1P g ,g P g ,g 1+ = . 
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 Axiom 1 is a special case of what is called the order-independence condition (see Suppes 
et al., 1989, pp. 411–412). The intuition is that if g1 is chosen more frequently than g2, then the 
fraction of times that g1 is preferred over g3 is higher than the fraction of times that g2 is preferred over 
g3. The Balance condition implies that the relation f%  is complete. Note that Axiom 1 implies that the 
relation f%  is transitive, because if 
 ( ) ( )1 2 2 31 1P g ,g and P g ,g2 2≥ ≥ , 
then, by (i) 
 ( ) ( )1 3 2 3 1P g ,g P g ,g 2≥ ≥ . 
Hence, Axiom 1 implies that the relation given in Definition 1 is a preference relation. 
 The next result is due to Tversky (1972). 
 
 Theorem 1 
 For all 1 2g ,g S∈ , Axiom 1 holds if and only if 
(3.1) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 1 2P g ,g F f g , f g= , 
for some suitable scale functional f, f : S R→ , and ( )2F : R 0,1→ , where F is a function that is 
strictly increasing in its first argument and strictly decreasing in the second. 
 
 The proof of Theorem 1 is found in Tversky (1972) and Suppes et al. (1989, p. 419). 
 
 When ( )1 2P g ,g  can be represented as in Theorem 1, the choice probabilities are said to 
be simply scalable, cf. Suppes et al. (1989, p. 410). The representation (3.1) seems to be the weakest 
possible representation for choice under uncertainty that one can think of. It would include any kind of 
probabilistic binary nonexpected utility model because the “preference functional” f is allowed to be 
completely general. Despite its generality, simple scalability is violated in some choice contexts; see, 
for example, Problem 2 in Suppes et al. (1989, p. 413). 
 Although the model in (3.1) involves a scale representation, it is not fully satisfactory 
from an empirical standpoint because the functional f is specified and the composition rule F is very 
general. 
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 Axiom 2 
 Let 1 2 3 4g ,g ,g ,g S∈ . The binary choice probabilities satisfy 
(i) the Quadruple condition: ( ) ( )1 2 3 4P g ,g P g ,g≥  if and only if ( ) ( )1 3 2 4P g ,g P g ,g≥ ; 
moreover, if either antecedent inequality is strict, so is the conclusion; 
(ii) Solvability: for any ( )∈y 0,1  and any 1 2 3g ,g ,g S∈  satisfying ( ) ( )1 2 1 3P g ,g y P g ,g≥ ≥ , 
there exists a g S∈  such that ( )1P g ,g y= ; 
(iii) the Balance condition: ( ) ( )1 2 2 1P g ,g P g ,g 1+ = . 
 
 Axiom 2 is due to Debreu (1958). The intuition of the Quadruple condition is related to 
the following example, where the binary choice probabilities have the form of the representation: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 1 2P g ,g K f g f g= − , 
where K is a strictly increasing cumulative distribution function on R, and f is a suitable mapping from 
S to R. Clearly, the choice model in this example satisfies the Quadruple condition. The example 
shows that when the average value of some lottery outcome probabilities g is represented by a scale 
functional, f(g), in such a way that the propensity to prefer lottery outcome probabilities g1 over g2 is a 
function of the “distance”, ( ) ( )1 2f g f g− , then the Quadruple condition must hold. The Solvability 
condition is fairly intuitive. If K is continuous, the Balance condition will also be fulfilled in the 
example above. 
 
 Theorem 2 
 Axiom 2 holds if and only if there exists a continuous and strictly increasing cumulative 
distribution function K with ( ) ( )K x K x 1+ − = , and a mapping f from S to some interval I such that 
the binary choice probabilities can be represented as 
(3.2) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 2 1 2P g ,g K f g f g= − , 
for 1 2g ,g S∈ , where 
 { }( )I x : x f g , g S= = ∈ . 
The mapping f is unique up to a linear transformation. The cumulative distribution function K is 
unique in the sense that if K1 and K0 are two representations, then ( ) ( )=0 1K x K ax , where a 0>  is a 
constant. 
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 The proof of Theorem 2 is given in the Appendix. In the special case with scalar 
representation of alternatives, proofs are given in Falmagne (1985) and Suppes et al. (1989). However, 
their proofs do not apply when the lotteries are represented by vectors of lottery outcome probabilities. 
In the special case with binary outcomes, the lottery outcome probabilities of lottery j can be 
represented by a scalar, namely by [ ]j jg (1), g (1) 0,1∈ . 
 The model in (3.2) is known in the literature as the Fechnerian representation (Fechner, 
1860/1966), and it clearly implies that the relation given in Definition 1 is a preference relation. It has 
the advantage of providing a cardinal utility functional representation. This model is, however, still too 
general to be directly useful in empirical applications because Theorem 2 is silent about the structure 
of the functional f and the c.d.f. K. If f is linear in the lottery outcome probabilities, we get a binary 
probabilistic version of the expected utility theory as a special case. Different versions of probabilistic 
nonexpected utility models follow as special cases when values of f are specified as suitable nonlinear 
functionals (see, for example, Starmer, 2000). 
 A crucial building block for corresponding choice probabilities in the multinomial case is 
the following axiom. 
 
 Axiom 3 (IIA) 
 For a given sg S∈ , ( ) ( )s rP g ,g 0,1∈  for all rg S∈ . Furthermore, for 
sg A B, A,B∈ ⊆ ∈B , 
 ( ) ( ) ( )B s A s BP g = P g P A . 
 
 Axiom 3 was first proposed by Luce (1959) in the context of probabilistic choice with 
certain outcomes, and it is called “Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives” (IIA). As is well 
known, it represents a probabilistic version of rationality in the following sense: Suppose the agent 
faces a set B of feasible lotteries. One may view the agent’s choice as if it takes place in two stages. In 
stage one, the agent selects a subset from B, which contains the most attractive alternatives. In the 
second stage, he or she chooses the most preferred alternative from this subset. In the second stage, the 
alternatives outside the subset selected in stage one are irrelevant. Thus, rationality is associated with 
the property that the agent only takes into consideration the lotteries within the presented choice set. 
The probability that a particular set A (say) will be chosen in the first stage is PB(A), and the 
probability that gs is chosen (when alternatives in B\A are irrelevant) is ( )A sP g . Thus, ( ) ( )B A sP A P g  
is the final probability of choosing gs. As indicated above, the crucial point here is that ( )A sP g  is 
independent of alternatives outside A. For the sake of interpretation, let J(B) denote the agent’s chosen 
lottery from B. With this notation, we can express IIA as: 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )B s s sP g P J(B) g P J(B) A P J(A) g= = = ∈ = . 
The conditional probability of choosing gs given that the choice belongs to A, equals 
 ( ) ( )( )
s
s
P J(B) g
P J(B) g J(B) A
P J(B) A
=
= ∈ =
∈
, 
so that IIA can be rewritten as 
 ( ) ( )s sP J(B) g J(B) A P J(A) g= ∈ = = . 
Whereas ( )sP J(A) g=  is the probability of choosing gs from a given choice set A, the conditional 
probability 
 ( )sP J(B) g J(B) A= ∈  
expresses the conditional probability of choosing gs from a given choice set B, given that the choice 
from B belongs to A. Clearly, 
 ( )sP J(B) g J(B) A= ∈  
will in general be different from 
 ( )sP J(A) g= . 
They only coincide when IIA holds. 
 As Axiom 3 is a probabilistic statement, it means that it represents probabilistic 
rationality in the sense that lotteries outside the second-stage choice set A may matter in single-choice 
experiments but will not affect average behavior. The following result has been obtained by Luce 
(1959): 
 
 Theorem 3 
 Axiom 3 holds if and only if there exist representative scale values, ( )sf g , for some 
functional f, such that 
(3.3) ( ) ( )( )( )( )
r
s
B s
r
g B
exp f g
P g
exp f g
∈
= ∑ , 
for all ∈ ∈rg B, B B . 
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 Thus, Axiom 3 implies that the relation given in Definition 1 is a preference relation. We 
realize that Axioms 1 and 2 are implied by Axiom 3. Under IIA, the representation (3.3) is the weakest 
possible representation that one can think of. It would include any kind of probabilistic nonexpected 
utility model because the functional f is allowed to be completely general. 
 Similarly to the models discussed above, the weakness of the representation (3.3) is that 
our theory is silent about the structure of the functional f. 
4. Probabilistic extensions of the expected utility theory 
As mentioned above, the theory developed so far has no implication for the structure of the functional 
f. In this section, we shall introduce axioms that allow further characterization. 
 The purpose of the first axiom is to impose necessary and sufficient conditions to insure 
that the binary relation given in Definition 1 is a preference relation. 
 
 Axiom 4 (Weak Stochastic Transitivity and Completeness) 
 Let 1 2 3g ,g ,g S∈ . The binary choice probabilities satisfy 
(i) weak Stochastic Transitivity: if ( )1 2 1P g ,g 2≥  and ( )2 3
1P g ,g
2
≥ , then ( )1 3 1P g ,g 2≥ ; 
(ii) the Balance condition: ( ) ( )1 2 2 1P g ,g P g ,g 1+ = . 
 
 Recall that the Balance condition is equivalent to completeness. It follows immediately 
that the binary relation given in Definition 1 is a preference relation, provided it satisfies Axiom 4. 
 Next, we introduce axioms that are intuitive probabilistic versions of the so-called 
Archimedean and Independence Axioms of von Neumann and Morgenstern. 
 
 Axiom 5 (Archimedean) 
 For all 1 2 3g ,g ,g S∈ , if 
 ( ) ( )1 2 2 31 1P g ,g and P g ,g2 2> > , 
then there exist ( ), 0,1α β ∈  such that 
 ( )( ) ( )( )1 3 2 2 1 31 1P g 1 g ,g and P g , g 1 g2 2α α β β+ − > + − > . 
 
 Axiom 5 is a probabilistic version of the Archimedean Axiom in the von Neumann-
Morgenstern expected utility theory because, by Definition 1, it is equivalent to the following 
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statement: if 1 2g gf  and 2 3g gf , then there exist ( ), 0,1α β∈  such that ( )1 3 2g 1 g gα + − α f  and 
( )2 1 3g g 1 gβ + − βf , cf. Karni and Schmeidler (1991, p. 1769). Note that Axiom 5 is weaker than the 
assumption that ( )r sP g ,g  is continuous. This is because if ( )r sP g ,g  is continuous in ( )r sg ,g , then 
whenever ( )1 2P g ,g 1 2>  and ( )2 3P g ,g 1 2> , continuity implies that ( )( )1 3 2P g 1 g ,g 1 2α + − α >  
and ( )( )2 1 3P g , g 1 g 1 2β + − β >  for a suitable α, (0,1)β∈ . 
 
 Axiom 6 (Independence) 
 For all 1 2 3g ,g ,g S∈ , and all [ ]0,1α ∈ , if 
 ( )1 2 1P g ,g 2≥ , 
then 
 ( ) ( )( )1 3 2 3 1P g 1 g , g 1 g 2α α α α+ − + − ≥ . 
 
 Axiom 6 is a probabilistic version of the Independence Axiom in the von Neumann–
Morgenstern expected utility theory because it is equivalent to the statement that if 1 2g gf , then 
( ) ( )1 3 2 3g 1 g g 1 gα + − α α + − αf , cf. Karni and Schmeidler (1991, p. 1769). 
 
 Theorem 4 (von Neumann-Morgenstern) 
 Let f%  be a binary relation. The following two conditions are equivalent. 
(i)  f%  is a preference relation satisfying Axioms 5 and 6. 
(ii) There exists a function, u : X R→ , that is unique up to a positive affine transformation 
such that the functional V : S R→  defined by 
(4.1) 
k X
V(g) u(k) g(k)
∈
= ∑ , 
represents the preference relation. 
 
 Theorem 4 is the von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility theorem, cf. Karni and 
Schmeidler (1991, pp. 1769–1770). 
 Recall that we cannot apply the result of Theorem 4 in our context without additional 
assumptions because the binary relation of Definition 1 is not necessarily a preference relation. 
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 As the binary relation given in Definition 1 is a preference relation when it satisfies 
Axiom 4, the next corollary follows. 
 
 Corollary 1 
 Assume that Axioms 4, 5 and 6 hold. Then for 1 2g ,g S∈ , 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 21P g ,g V g V g2≥ ⇔ ≥ . 
Moreover, if either antecedent inequality is strict, so is the conclusion. 
 
 Even if the binary relation given in Definition 1 satisfies Axioms 4, 5 and 6, we would 
still not be able to specify choice probabilities that represent a generalization of the expected utility 
theory. We would at most be able to ascertain whether gr is preferred to gs (say) in the aggregate sense. 
Consequently, similarly to the approach in Section 3, we need to provide additional theoretical 
building blocks to ascertain precisely how the choice probabilities ( ){ }r sP g ,g  can be represented by 
the lottery outcome probabilities gr and gs. This is crucial for establishing a link between the 
theoretical concepts introduced above and a model that is applicable for empirical modeling and 
analysis. 
 The next result is analogous to Theorem 1. 
 
 Theorem 5 
 For all g1 and g2 ∈ S, Axioms 1, 5 and 6 hold if and only if 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 1 2P g ,g F V g ,V g= , 
where 
 
k X
V(g) u(k) g(k)
∈
= ∑ , 
and ( )2F : R 0,1→  is a function that is strictly increasing in its first argument and strictly decreasing 
in the second, and u: X → R is a function that is unique up to a positive linear transformation. 
 
 The proof of Theorem 5 is given in the Appendix. 
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 Theorem 6 
 For all 1 2g , g S∈ , Axioms 2, 5 and 6 hold if and only if 
(4.2) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ){ }1 2 1 2P g ,g K h V g h V g= − , 
where 
(4.3) ( ) ( ) ( )
∈
=∑s s
k X
V g u k g k , 
and K is a continuous and strictly increasing cumulative distribution function defined on R with 
( ) ( )+ − =K x K x 1 , h : R R→  is strictly increasing and →u : X R . The mappings K, h and V  are 
unique in the sense that if ( )0 1 0 0K and K , h V  and ( )1 1h V  are two representations, then 
( ) ( )=0 1K x K ax , where a 0>  is a constant, ( ) ( )= +1 s 1 0 s 1V g b V g c  and ( ) ( )1 1 1 2 0 2h b x c b h x c+ = + , 
where 1b 0> , 2b 0> , c1 and c2 are constants. 
 
 The proof of Theorem 6 is given in the Appendix. 
 
 Remark 
 Note that the formulation in (4.2) is equivalent to 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )1 2 1 2P g ,g K h V g h V g= % %% , 
where K%  is a continuous and strictly increasing c.d.f. on R+ and h%  is positive and strictly increasing. 
This follows immediately from (4.2), by defining ( )xK(x) K e=%  and h(x) log h(x)=% . 
 
 Theorem 7 
 Assume that ( ) ( )r sP g ,g 0,1∈  for all r sg , g S∈ . Then, for ∈B B , Axioms 3, 5 and 6 
hold if and only if 
(4.4)  ( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( )
r
s
B s
r
B
exp h V g
P g
exp h V g
∈
= ∑
g
,  
where 
  ( )s s
k X
V g u(k) g (k)
∈
= ∑ ,  
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and →h:R R  is strictly increasing and u: X R→ . The mappings h and V are unique in the sense that 
if ( )0 0h V  and ( )1 1h V  are two representations, then ( ) ( )1 r 0 rV g bV g c= +  and ( ) ( )1 0h bx c h x d+ = + , 
where b 0> , c and d are constants. 
 
 The proof of Theorem 7 is given in the Appendix. 
 
 The choice model obtained in Theorem 7 is a special case of the Luce model for wagers, 
proposed by Becker et al. (1963). They postulated that 
(4.5) ( ) ( )( )( )( )
r
s
B s
r
B
V g
P g
V g
∈
ψ
=
ψ∑
g
, 
where : R R+ψ →  is a strictly increasing mapping that is unique up to a multiplicative constant. By 
letting log (x) h(x)ψ = , we find that (4.5) is equivalent to (4.4). 
 The model in (4.4) characterizes the choice probabilities in terms of a linear preference 
functional V up to an unknown monotone mapping h. However, the underlying axioms imply no 
additional restrictions on h. 
 
 Axiom 7 (Strong independence) 
 For all * *1 2 1 2 3g ,g ,g ,g ,g S∈  and all [ ]∈ 0,1α , if 
 ( ) ( )* *1 2 1 2P g ,g P g ,g ,≥  
then 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ).* *1 3 2 3 1 3 2 3P g + 1- g , g + 1- g P g + 1- g , g + 1- gα α α α α α α α≥  
 
 Axiom 7 states that if the fraction of replications where *1g  is chosen over 
*
2g  is less than 
or equal to the fraction of replications where 1g  is chosen over 2g , this inequality still holds when gj 
is replaced by ( )j 3g 1 gα + − α  and *jg  is replaced by ( )*j 3g 1 gα + − α , for j 1,2.=  Note that in Axiom 
7, it is not claimed that ( )1 2P g ,g  is equal to ( ) ( )( )1 3 2 3P g + 1 g , g + 1 gα − α α − α . 
 It follows that Axiom 7 implies Axiom 6. To realize this, note that when * *1 2g g= , then 
( )* *1 2P g ,g 1 2,=  and 
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 ( ) ( )( )* *1 3 2 3P g 1 g , g 1 g 1 2α + − α α + − α = . 
Thus, it follows from this and Axiom 7 that when 
 ( )1 2P g ,g 1 2≥ , 
then: 
 ( ) ( )( )1 3 2 3P g 1 g , g 1 g 1 2α + − α α + − α ≥ , 
which we recognize as Axiom 6. 
 The intuition why Axiom 7 is stronger than Axiom 6 is related to the fact that it 
represents a statement that involves comparisons between the degree to which one lottery is chosen 
over a second and the degree to which a third lottery is chosen over a fourth. It is this strengthening 
that enables us to derive strong functional form restrictions on the choice probabilities, to be 
considered next. 
 
 Theorem 8 
 Axioms 2, 5 and 7 hold if and only if the choice probabilities have the form as in (4.2) 
with 
(4.6) ( )h x xβ κ= + , 
where 0β >  and κ are constants. 
 
 The proof of Theorem 8 is given in the Appendix. 
 
 Corollary 2 
 For all r sg ,g S∈ , and B ∈B , Axioms 3, 5 and 7 hold if and only if 
 ( ) ( )( )( )( )
r
s
B s
r
B
exp V g
P g
exp V g
∈
= ∑
g
. 
 
 The proof of Corollary 2 is given in the Appendix. 
 
 There are two alternative interpretations of the Axioms above, which represent extensions 
of the corresponding von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms. The first interpretation is as follows. 
Consider an agent who participates in a large number of replications of a choice experiment. The agent 
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may be boundedly rational in the sense that he or she has difficulties assessing the precise value (to 
him or her) of the strategies in each single replication. This may be so even if the agent has no 
problem with assessing the values of the outcomes, simply because the evaluations of the respective 
lottery strategies do not follow immediately from the values of the outcomes and the outcome 
probabilities. The axioms state that whereas the agent is allowed to make “errors” when selecting 
strategies in each replication of the experiment (in the sense that his or her behavior is not consistent 
with the von Neumann–Morgenstern theory), the agent will still⎯in the aggregate sense specified in 
the axioms⎯behave according to the respective versions of the probabilistic extension of the von 
Neumann–Morgenstern theory. 
 In the alternative interpretation, we consider a large observationally homogeneous 
population. In this setting, each agent in the population faces the same choice experiment. Although 
the behavior of each individual agent may be inconsistent with the von Neumann–Morgenstern theory, 
the axioms above state that aggregate behavior in the population will be consistent with the 
probabilistic version of the theory. 
5. Monetary rewards 
The setting we shall discuss here is somewhat different from the previous one in that we focus on 
applications where money is involved. Specifically, we now assume that the set of outcomes is a set of 
money amounts. Thus, the lottery outcomes of the choice experiment consist of pairs 
{ ( )kk, w X W∈ × }, where W is a subset of [ )0,∞  or equal to [ )0,∞  and kw W∈  is a given amount 
associated with outcome k. The corresponding probability of outcome ( )kk, w , given lottery s is 
denoted by ( )s kg k, w . The utilities are now given as ( ){ }ku k, w . Let S and B be defined as in Section 
2. What distinguishes the present setting from the previous one is that one component (money) of the 
outcome is an ordered variable. The purpose of this section is to utilize this property to characterize 
the functional form of the utility function ( )u k, w . 
 Let wδ  denote the Dirac measure, that is: 
 w
1 if w x
(x)
0 otherwise,
=⎧δ = ⎨⎩  
and define sg
λ  by: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
ks k s k w k
g k w g k w w, ,λ λ= δ% % , 
where ( )kk, w X W∈ ×%  and λ is a positive real number. Although sgλ  also depends on { }kw , this is 
suppressed in the notation. 
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 Axiom 8 
 Let sg S∈  for s 1,2,3,4= . Then 
 ( ) ( )1 1 1 11 2 3 4P g ,g P g ,g≤ , 
if and only if 
 ( ) ( )1 2 3 4P g ,g P g ,gλ λ λ λ≤ , 
for any 0λ >  and ∈ ∈kw W , k X . 
 
 Axiom 8 means that if the fraction of individuals that prefer g1 over g2 is less than the 
fraction that prefers 3g  over 4g , then this inequality does not change if all the incomes (potential 
outcomes) are rescaled by the same factor while the lottery outcome probabilities remain unchanged. 
 Before we state the next result, we adopt the definition: 
 x 1 log x
θ
−
=
θ
, 
when 0θ = . The function ( )x 1θ − θ  will then be differentiable and strictly increasing for all θ. 
 The intuition is, loosely speaking, that the agent is “to some degree” viewed as being 
indifferent with respect to scale transformations of the potential money rewards when comparing 
lotteries. By the above notion of “some degree”, it is meant that the respective binary choice 
probabilities may change as a result of the rescaling of rewards, but only in such a way that the 
original inequality of Axiom 8 is preserved. 
 
 Theorem 9 
 Axioms 2, 5, 6 and 8 hold if and only if the choice probabilities have the form as in (4.2) 
with either 
(i) ( ) ( ) ( )
xe 1
h x and u k ,w blog w c
θβ
κ
θ
−
= + = + , 
for w 0> , and θ ≠ 0, 
(ii) ( ) ( ) k w 1h x x and u k ,w b c
ρ
β κ
ρ
⎛ ⎞−
= + = +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, 
for w > 0, and θ = 0, or 
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(iii) ( ) ( ) ( ) kx 1h x and u k ,w b w
θ
ρβ κ
θ
−
= + = , 
for ≥w 0 , where > 0β , b 0> , kb 0,>  0ρ > , κ  and c are constants. 
 
 The proof of Theorem 9 is given in the Appendix. 
 
  
 Axiom 9 
 Let 1 2g ,g S∈ . Then 
 ( ) ( )1 11 2 1 2P g ,g P g ,gλ λ= , 
for any real number > 0λ  and kw W , k X∈ ∈ . 
 
 Axiom 9 is stronger than Axiom 8 because it postulates that the choice probabilities are 
invariant under scale transformations of the rewards. This means that the agent is viewed as being 
indifferent with respect to rescaling of the potential money rewards. 
 
 Corollary 3 
 Axioms 2, 5, 6 and 9 hold if and only if the choice probabilities have the form as in (4.2) 
with 0θ = , i.e., either 
(i) ( ) ( )= + = +kh x x and u k ,w b log w cβ κ , 
for w 0> , or 
(ii) ( ) ( ) kh x log x and u k ,w b wρβ κ= + = , 
for w 0≥ , where > 0β , kb 0> , 0ρ > , κ and c are constants. 
 
 The proof of Corollary 3 is given in the appendix. Note that when 1β = , the choice model 
in Corollary 3 (ii) reduces to the so-called Strict Expected Utility model for uncertain outcomes 
proposed by Luce and Suppes (1965). 
 
 Corollary 4 
 Axioms 3, 5, 6 and 8 hold if and only if the choice model (4.4) holds with h and u as in 
Theorem 9. 
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 Proof 
 The “if” part of the corollary is evident. Consider the “only if” part. Recall that Axioms 3, 
5 and 6 imply Theorem 7. As Axiom 2 is implied by Axiom 3, the conditions of Theorem 9 are 
fulfilled, and thus the structure of h and u must be as in (i), (ii) or (iii) of Theorem 9. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
 Corollary 5 
 Axioms 2, 5, 7 and 8 hold if and only if the choice model in (4.2) holds with 
 ( ) ( ) ⎛ ⎞−= + = +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠k
w 1h x x and u k ,w b c
ρ
β κ
ρ
, 
for w≥ 0 if ρ ≠ 0, and w > 0 if ρ = 0. 
 
 Proof 
 Evidently, the “if” part of the corollary is true. Consider the “only if” part. Recall that 
Axioms 3, 5 and 7 imply Theorem 8. As Axiom 2 is implied by Axiom 3, the conditions of Theorem 9 
are fulfilled, and as h must, by Theorem 8, be linear, the structure of h and u must be as in (ii) of 
Theorem 9, or as in (iii) of Theorem 9 with θ = 1. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
 The next result is analogous to Corollary 4 and follows from Corollary 5. 
 
 Corollary 6 
 Axioms 3, 5, 7 and 8 hold if and only if the choice model (4.4) holds with h and u as in 
Corollary 5. 
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Figure 1. Overview of axioms 
 
Axiom 1 
            (i)          ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 3 2 31P g ,g P g ,g P g ,g2≥ ⇔ ≥ , 
            (ii)                     ( ) ( )1 2 2 1P g ,g P g ,g 1+ = . 
 
Axiom 2 
(i)    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3 4 1 3 2 4P g ,g P g ,g P g ,g P g ,g≥ ⇔ ≥ , 
(ii)  For y such that ( ) ( )1 3 1 2P g ,g y P g ,g ,≥ ≥  there is a g S∈  
       such that ( )1P g ,g y= , 
(iii) ( ) ( )1 2 2 1P g ,g P g ,g 1+ = . 
 
Axiom 3 (IIA) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
s s r r
B s A s B s
For given g S, P g ,g 0,1 for all g S,
P g P g P A , g A B, A,B
∈ ∈ ∈
= ∈ ⊂ ∈B
. 
 
Axiom 4 
        (i)   If ( )1 2 1P g ,g 2≥  and ( ) ( )2 3 1 3
1 1P g ,g P g ,g
2 2
≥ ⇒ ≥ , 
        (ii)  ( ) ( )1 2 2 1P g ,g P g ,g 1+ = . 
 
Axiom 5 
If ( ) ( )1 2 2 31 1P g ,g and P g ,g2 2> > , 
there exist ( ), 0,1α β∈  such that: 
( )( ) ( )( )1 3 2 2 1 31 1P g 1 g ,g and P g , g 1 g2 2α + − α > β + − β > . 
 
Axiom 6 
( )1 2 1P g ,g 2>  
⇓ 
( ) ( )( )
[ ]
1 3 2 3
1P g 1 g , g 1 g
2
for all 0,1
α + − α α + − α >
α ∈
. 
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Figure 1 (cont). Overview of axioms 
 
Axiom 7 
( ) ( )* *1 2 1 2P g ,g P g ,g≥  
⇓ 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
[ ]
* *
1 3 2 3 1 3 2 3P g 1 g , g 1 g P g 1 g , g 1 g
for all 0,1
α + − α α + − α ≥ α + − α α + − α
α∈
. 
 
Axiom 8 
( ) ( )1 1 1 11 2 3 4P g ,g P g ,g≤ , 
c  
( ) ( )1 2 3 4P g ,g P g ,g , 0λ λ λ λ≤ ∀λ > , 
where ( ) ( ) ( )
ks k s k w k
g k, w g k, w wλ λ= δ% % . 
 
Axiom 9 
( ) ( )1 11 2 1 2P g ,g P g ,g for all 0λ λ= ∀λ > . 
 
 
Axiom 1 ⇒ Axiom 4 
   
Axiom 2 ⇒ Axiom 1 Axiom 4 
   
Axiom 3 ⇒ 
Axiom 1 
Axiom 2 
Axiom 4 
   
Axiom 7 ⇒ Axiom 6 
   
Axiom 9 ⇒ Axiom 8 
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Figure 2. Relationship between axioms and binary choice probabilities 
Axiom 1 ⇔ 
Theorem 1. ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 1 2P g ,g F f g ,f g= ,  
for F strictly increasing in its first argument and 
strictly decreasing in the second and f is some 
mapping from S to R. 
   
Axiom 2 ⇔ 
Theorem 2. ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 1 2P g ,g K f g f g= − , 
for some function f that is unique up to a positive 
linear transformation and a c.d.f. K that is strictly 
increasing, symmetric and continuous. 
   
Axioms 4, 5, 6 ⇔ 
Corollary 1. ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 21P g ,g V g V g2≥ ⇔ ≥ , 
where ( )s s
k X
V g u(k)g (k)
∈
=∑ . 
   
Axioms 1, 5, 6 ⇔ 
Theorem 5. ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 1 2P g ,g F V g ,V g= ,  
for F strictly increasing in its first argument and 
strictly decreasing in the second. 
   
Axioms 2, 5, 6 ⇔ 
Theorem 6. ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ){ }1 2 1 2P g ,g K h V g h V g= − , 
with h and K strictly increasing, symmetric and 
continuous. 
   
Axioms 2, 5, 7 ⇔ Theorem 8. ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 2 1 2P g ,g K V g V g= − ,  
with K strictly increasing, symmetric and continuous. 
 
 
 Figure 3. Relationship between axioms and multinomial choice probabilities 
Axiom 3 ⇔ Theorem 3. ( )
( )( )
( )( )
r
s
B s
r
B
exp f g
P g
exp f g
∈
= ∑
g
, for some f. 
   
Axioms 3, 5, 6 ⇔ 
Theorem 7. ( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( )
r
s
B s
r
B
exp h V g
P g
exp h V g
∈
= ∑
g
,  
for some strictly increasing h. 
   
Axioms 3, 5, 7 ⇔ Corollary 2. ( )
( )( )
( )( )
r
s
B s
r
B
exp V g
P g
exp V g
∈
= ∑
g
. 
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 Figure 4.  Relationship between axioms and choice probabilities for the case with 
monetary rewards 
Axioms 2, 5, 6, 8 ⇔ 
Theorem 9. Choice probabilities are as in Theorem 6 with 
( )xe 1
h(x)
θβ −
= + κ
θ
 and u(k, w) blog w c, w 0, 0,= + > θ ≠  
h(x) x= β + κ  and ( )kb w 1u(k, w) c, w 0,ρ −= + >
ρ
 or 
( )x 1
h(x)
θβ −
= + κ
θ
 and ku(k, w) b w , w 0
ρ
= ≥ , 
k0, b 0, b 0β > > > . 
   
Axioms 2, 5, 6, 9 ⇔ 
Corollary 3. Choice probabilities are as in Theorem 6 with 
h(x) x= β + κ  and ku(k, w) b log w c, w 0= + > , 
or 
h(x) log x= β + κ  and ku(k, w) b w , w 0ρ= ≥ , 
k0, b 0, b 0β > > > . 
   
Axioms 3, 5, 6, 8 ⇔ 
Corollary 4. Choice probabilities are as in Theorem 7 with 
( )xe 1
h(x)
θβ −
= + κ
θ
 and ( )u k, w blog w c, w 0, 0,= + > θ ≠
h(x) x= β + κ  and ku(k, w) b log w c,w 0,= + >  or 
 
( )x 1
h(x)
θβ −
= + κ
θ
 and ( ) ku k, w b w , w 0ρ= ≥ , 
k0, b 0, b 0β > > > . 
   
Axioms 2, 5, 7, 8 ⇔ 
Corollary 5. Choice probabilities are as in Theorem 8 with 
h(x) x= β + κ  and ( ) k kb (w 1)u k, w c ,w 0,
ρ
−
= + ≥
ρ
0,ρ ≠  
k0, b 0β > > , and w 0>  when 0ρ = . 
   
Axioms 3, 5, 7, 8 ⇔ 
Corollary 6. Choice probabilities are as in Theorem 7 with 
h(x) x= β + κ  and ( ) k kb (w 1)u k, w c ,w 0,
ρ
−
= + ≥
ρ
0,ρ ≠  
k0, b 0β > > , and w 0>  when 0ρ = . 
 
 Figures 1–4 display a convenient overview and summary of the results obtained in the 
paper. It is an important feature of the axioms that they have direct empirical counterparts. Figures 2 
and 3 emphasize the equivalences between sets of axioms and the structure of the respective choice 
probabilities. However, some of these choice probabilities depend on unknown functional forms (f, K 
and h). For example, all the binary choice probabilities depend on an unknown c.d.f. K. Only 
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Corollaries 2, 3, 4 and 5 and Theorem 9 yield fully specified functional forms for the choice 
probabilities. As all the axioms have explicit empirical counterparts, they can be used to test these 
models without relying on ad hoc functional form specifications. To carry out rigorous nonparametric 
tests of these axioms is in itself a complicated task. In fact, it seems that the general case with ordinal 
restrictions on choice probabilities of the type displayed in Figure 1 lies outside the scope of a large 
body of literature devoted to statistical hypotheses testing under ordinal constraints. As far as we 
know, only Iverson and Falmagne (1985) and Dagsvik and Røine (2006) have explicitly addressed the 
challenge of developing test procedures for this type of setting. In particular, Iverson and Falmagne 
(1985) discuss how one can test property (i) of Axiom 1 and property (i) of Axiom 2 within a 
maximum likelihood setting. 
6. A random utility representation 
In this section, we shall consider the problem of a random utility representation of the agent’s 
preferences over lotteries that yield choice probabilities satisfying Axioms 2, 3 and 7. From the theory 
of discrete choice, we know that the Luce choice model is consistent with an additive random utility 
representation in which the error terms are independent (across alternatives) with extreme value c.d.f., 
( )xexp e−− . Here, the setting is not as simple as in the standard discrete choice case because S is not 
countable and g is a vector. Therefore, if a random utility representation { }U(g),g S∈  exists, it must 
be a multiparameter stochastic process, i.e., a random field. 
 
 Theorem 10 (Random utility representation) 
 There exist a probability space and random variables ( ){ }g , g Sε ∈  defined on it, such 
that ( )s sg , s 1,2,...,g Sε = ∈ , are independent for distinct 1 2g ,g ,...,  and 
(6.1) ( )( ) ( )ysP g y exp eε −≤ = − , 
for ∈y R . The random utility representation 
(6.2) ( ) ( )( ) ( )U g = h V g gε+ , 
for g S∈ , is consistent with Axioms 3, 5 and 6, i.e., for ∈B B . 
(6.3) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( )r
r
s
B s s rg B
r
B
exp h V g
P g = P U g = maxU g = .
exp h V g∈
∈
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ∑
g
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 The proof of Theorem 10 is given in the appendix. The next result is immediate. 
 
 Corollary 6 
 Axioms 3, 6 and 7 are consistent with the random utility representation 
 ( ) ( ) ( )U g V g gε= + , 
for g S∈ , where the c.d.f. of ( )gε  is given in (6.1). 
 
 Remark 
 The distribution function given in (6.1) is a so-called type III extreme value distribution.2 
In statistics, the extreme value distributions arise as the asymptotic distributions of the maximum of 
i.i.d. random variables. Many authors have studied this distribution in the context of the theory of 
discrete choice and random utility models; see, for example, McFadden (1973), Yellott (1977) and 
Strauss (1979). Under different regularity conditions, they have demonstrated that (6.1) is the only 
distribution that implies a random utility representation that is consistent with the Luce model (IIA). 
7. The Allais paradox 
Starting with Allais (1953), it has long been known that people’s behavior under uncertainty may 
systematically violate the Independent axiom in the expected utility theory. The examples that Allais 
(1953) discussed have played an important role in the development of nonexpected utility theory. The 
examples discussed by Allais are special cases of more general phenomena called the common 
consequence effect and the common ratio effect. To explain what these phenomena mean, let g1 and g2 
be two lotteries with binary outcomes such that lottery one has payoff y with probability g and payoff 
c with probability 1 g− . Lottery two has payoff q with probability g and payoff c with probability 
1 g− , where q is also a lottery that has payoff x with probability µ and payoff 0x with probability 
1 , 0 1− µ < µ < . The expected utilities of the first and second lotteries, 1 2V ,V ,  are 
 ( )1 2V g x 1 g c= + − , 
and 
 ( ) ( )2 1 0V g x 1 g x 1 g c= µ + − µ + − . 
                                                     
2 There seems to be some confusion in the literature about the terminology. Some authors call (5.1) the type III extreme value 
distribution, whereas other authors call it the type I extreme value distribution. Some authors also call it the Double 
Exponential Distribution. 
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The payoffs are nonnegative (usually monetary) consequences such that 2 1 0x x x> < . Note that both 
lotteries yield payoff c with probability 1 g− . This is the “common consequence”. As 
( )2 1 0x x 1 x> µ + − µ , it follows that 1 2V V> , irrespective of the value of c. However, researchers have 
found that behavior is indeed systematically influenced by c, with a tendency to choose the first lottery 
when 2c x=  and the second when 0c x= . This kind of behavior was predicted by Allais and is known 
as the Allais paradox, cf. Allais (1953). 
 A second type of phenomenon, also discussed by Allais, is called the common ratio effect. 
To explain what this means, consider lotteries three and four, where lottery three has payoff x2 with 
probability g and payoff x0 with probability 1 g− . Lottery four has payoff x1 with probability µg and 
payoff x0 with probability 1 g− µ , where 2 1 0x x x> > . The corresponding expected utilities are: 
 ( ) ( )3 2 0 2 0 0V g x 1 g x g x x x= + − = − + , 
and 
 ( ) ( )4 1 0 1 0 0V g x 1 g x g x x x= µ + − µ = µ − + . 
Evidently, 3 4V V> , irrespective of the value of g. However, experimental evidence indicates that 
when µ is fixed, individuals reveal a tendency to switch towards lottery four as g decreases. 
 Let us now consider these phenomena in the present case with probabilistic choice, and 
under the Axioms 2, 5 and 6. Then, the choice probability of preferring lottery 1 over lottery 2 is given 
by: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )1 2 2 1 0K h V h V K h g x 1 g c h g x 1 g x 1 g c− = + − − µ + − µ + − . 
From this expression, we realize that the choice probability will depend on the common consequence 
c, provided the mapping h is nonlinear. Although 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )2 1 0 1K h g x 1 g c h g x 1 g x 1 g c 2+ − − µ + − µ + − > , 
owing to the fact that ( )2 1 0g x g x 1 g x> µ + − µ , the fraction that prefers lottery two is less than 1 2  
but may be close to 1 2 . Similarly 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )3 4 2 0 0 1 0 0K h V h V K h g x x x h g x x x− = − + − µ − + . 
In this case, the choice probability will depend on g and 0x even if h is linear. Also, in this case: 
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 ( )( ) ( )( )( )2 0 0 1 0 0 1K h g x x x h g x x x 2− + − µ − + > . 
Thus, we realize that with probabilistic models, such as the ones developed in this paper, the common 
consequence and common ratio effect may occur for less than 50 per cent of the population. 
 Only under Axioms 2, 5 and 7 does the common consequence effect vanish. The common 
ratio effect will only vanish when h(x) log x= β + κ  and 0x 0= . 
8. An example 
For the sake of illustrating the empirical relevance and usefulness of the theory developed above, we 
provide a discussion of the following example. The agent has the choice of working in either of two 
wage sectors or in a self-employment sector, denoted by alternatives one, two and three, respectively. 
In wage work sector j, the agent receives earnings jw , j 1,2= , with perfect certainty. In sector 3, 
earnings are uncertain. Hours of work in each sector are given. An example of a self-employment 
activity with fixed hours of work is running a café or a bar with fixed opening hours. We assume that 
the agent has been running the business⎯or similar businesses⎯for many periods and consequently is 
able to calculate the empirical distribution of returns to his or her business. For simplicity, we 
approximate this distribution with a discrete distribution. Let u(j,w) be the utility of working in sector j 
at wage income w. Let g3(w) be the lottery outcome probability that the agent receives wage w given 
that he or she chooses to work in the self-employment sector. The expected utilities of working in the 
wage sector reduce to ( )1u 1, w  and ( )2u 2, w , respectively, whereas the expected utility of working in 
sector 3 equals: 
 ( ) 3
w W
u 3, w g (w)
∈
∑ . 
Under the assumptions of Corollary 2, it follows that the probability of working in wage sector j 
equals: 
(8.1) 
( )( )
( )( ) ( )
j
B 2
s 3
s 1 w W
exp u j, w
P ( j)
exp u s,w exp u 3,w g (w)
= ∈
= ⎛ ⎞
+ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑
% , 
for j 1,2= , where { }B 1,2,3= . The probability of working in sector 3 equals: 
(8.2) 
( )
( )( ) ( )
3
w W
B 2
s 3
s 1 w W
exp u 3,w g (w)
P (3) .
exp u s, w exp u 3,w g (w)
∈
= ∈
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
= ⎛ ⎞
+ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑
∑ ∑
%  
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With convenient parametric specification of the utility function u(j,w), one can estimate the unknown 
parameters of the utility function by the method of maximum likelihood, provided data on agents’ 
choices are available. 
 Alternatively, under the assumptions of Corollary 4, it follows that the probability of 
working in sector j becomes: 
(8.3) 
( )( )( )
( )( )( ) ( ) ( )
j
B 2
s 3
s 1 w W
exp h u j,w
P ( j)
exp h u s,w exp h u 3,w g w
= ∈
= ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞
+ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠∑ ∑
, 
for j 1,2= , and a similar expression applies to the probability of working in sector 3, where h and u 
are given as in Corollary 4. Consequently, one can apply likelihood ratio test procedures, for example, 
to test the hypothesis that specification (i) of Corollary 4 is true, against the alternative specification 
(ii) in Corollary 4. Recall that the maximum likelihood estimation procedure goes as follows. Let Yj 
denote the number of agents that have chosen to work in sector j as observed in the data, and assume 
for simplicity that the choice probabilities above do not depend on observed individual characteristics. 
As is well known, the loglikelihood function can be expressed as: 
 j B
j
LogL Y log P ( j)=∑ , 
from which the unknown parameters are obtained by maximization of logL. The general case with 
individual characteristics is completely analogous. We refer to Amemiya (1985), and Ben-Akiva and 
Lerman (1985) for details about inference methods for discrete choice models. 
9. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have developed a theory of probabilistic choice for risky choices based on different 
combinations of particular axioms. First, we have considered choice models with “minimal” structure 
on the choice probabilities. Second, we have generalized the expected utility theory to a probabilistic 
version. We have explored the relationship between sets of axioms and the structure of the 
corresponding choice probabilities. In particular, some sets of axioms imply a complete 
characterization of the functional form of the choice probabilities. The case in which the outcomes are 
money amounts is given particular attention, and it is demonstrated that particular invariance axioms 
that may apply in this setting yield an explicit characterization of the functional form of the model. 
 An interesting property of the models is that they rationalize the so-called common 
consequence effect and the common ratio effect. 
 31
 As most of the axioms proposed are nonparametric, they can be utilized to carry out 
nonparametric tests of the respective structures of the choice probabilities. Finally, to illustrate the 
potential for applications we have discussed a concrete example. 
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Appendix 
 
 Proof of Theorem 2 
 Debreu (1958) has proved that Axiom 2 implies that there exists a cardinal representation 
f (g), g S∈ , such that for 1 2 3 4g ,g ,g ,g S∈  
(A.1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4P g ,g P g ,g f g f g f g f g≤ ⇔ − ≤ − , 
where the inequality on one side is strict if and only if the inequality on the other side is strict. From 
(A.1), it follows that g1, g2, g3 and g4 satisfy ( ) ( )1 2 3 4P g ,g P g ,g= , if and only if 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3 4f g f g f g f g− = − . However, this means that we can write 
 ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 2 1 2P g ,g K f g f g= − , 
for some suitable function K. Evidently, K(x) is strictly increasing and takes values in [0,1]. Without 
loss of generality, it can be chosen to be a cumulative distribution function. The Balance condition 
implies that K(x) K( x) 1+ − = , which means that K is symmetric. Recall that a cumulative distribution 
function is continuous to the right. As K is symmetric, it must also be continuous to the left. Hence, K 
is continuous. 
 Next, we shall prove the uniqueness of K. Suppose that ( )0 0f ,K  and ( )1 1f ,K  are two 
representations of the binary choice probabilities. Then 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )0 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 2K f g f g K f g f g− = − , 
for any 1 2g , g S∈ . As f0 and f1 are unique up to a linear transformation, we can write 
 1 0f (g) a f (g) b= + , 
for g S∈ , where a and b are constants and a 0> . This yields 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )0 0 1 0 2 1 0 1 0 2K f g f g K a f g f g− = − , 
which demonstrates that 0 1K (x) K (ax)= . 
 To prove that I is an interval, let 0g S∈  be a fixed point of reference. Let 1 2g ,g S∈  be 
such that ( ) ( )2 1f g f g≥ , and let ( ) ( )1 2x f g , f g∈ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  be arbitrary. Hence, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 0 0 2 0f g f g x f g f g f g− ≤ − ≤ − , or equivalently 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 11 0 0 2 0K P g ,g x f g K P g ,g− −≤ − ≤ , 
 35
which yields 
(A.2) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 0 0 2 0P g ,g K x f g P g ,g≤ − ≤ . 
By Axiom 2 (ii), there exists a *g S∈  such that ( ) ( )( )*0 0P g ,g K f g x= − . Thus, (A.2) implies that 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )* *0 0 0K f g f g P g ,g K x f g− = = − , 
so that ( )*x f g= . Therefore, x I∈ . Hence, we have proved that I is an interval. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
 Proof of Theorem 5 
 When the choice probabilities given in Theorem 5 hold, then evidently Axioms 1, 5 and 6 
hold. Consider next the “only if” part of the proof. Tversky (1972) and Suppes et al. (1989, p. 419) 
have proved that Axiom 1 is equivalent to the representation 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 1 2P g ,g F f g ,f g= % , 
for 1 2g ,g S∈ , where f is an ordinal scale functional defined on S and F%  is a function that is strictly 
increasing in its first argument and strictly decreasing in the second. Hence 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 21P g ,g f g f g2≥ ⇔ ≥ , 
and { }f (g),g S∈  therefore represents the binary relation f%  given in Definition 1. Accordingly, f%  is a 
preference relation so that by Theorem 4 and Axioms 5 and 6 
 ( )f (g) h V(g)= , 
for some strictly increasing function h. Hence 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 1 2P g ,g F V g ,V g= , 
where 
 ( ) ( )F x, y F h(x),h(y)= % . 
  Q.E.D. 
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 Proof of Theorem 6 
 When the choice probabilities in Theorem 6 hold, then Axioms 2, 5 and 6 are satisfied. 
Consider the “only if” part. Debreu (1958) proved that Axiom 2 implies that there exists a mapping f 
from S to some interval such that for 1 2 3 4g , g , g , g S∈  
 ( ) ( )1 2 3 4P g ,g P g ,g≥ , 
if and only if 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3 4f g f g f g f g− ≥ − . 
Thus, with 3 4g g=  we get 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2P g ,g 0.5 f g f g≥ ⇔ ≥ , 
and ( ){ }f g , g S∈  therefore represents f%  on S. Consequently, f%  is a preference relation. Then, 
Theorem 4 and Axioms 5 and 6 imply that f (g)  must be a strictly increasing function h (say) of 
( )V g . That is 
(A.3) ( ) ( )( )f g h V g= . 
As Axiom 2 implies Theorem 2, we can combine (A.3) and (3.2), from which we get the desired 
result. Furthermore, by Theorem 2, V(⋅) is unique up to a linear transformation. As evidently f(⋅) must 
also be unique up to a linear transformation, we obtain the restrictions on ( )h V( )⋅  stated in the 
theorem. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
 Proof of Theorem 7 
 It follows immediately that the “if” part of the theorem is true. Consider the “only if” 
part. From the theory of discrete choice (see, for example, McFadden, 1984), it follows that Axiom 3 
holds if and only if for any B∈B  
 ( ) ( )( )
r
s
B s
r
B
a g
P g
a g
∈
= ∑
g
, 
where ( )s sa g , g S∈ , is a positive scalar that depends solely on gs and is unique apart from a 
multiplicative positive constant. Let { }r sB g ,g= . Then 
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 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
s
s r
s r r s
a g 1P g ,g .
a g a g 1 a g a g
= =
+ +
 
Thus 
  ( ) ( ) ( )s r s rP g ,g 0.5 a g a g≥ ⇔ ≥ , 
and ( ){ }s sa g ,g S∈  therefore represents f%  on S. Consequently, f%  is a preference relation. Then, by 
Theorem 4, ( )sa g  must be a strictly increasing function of ( )sV g . Hence 
  ( ) ( )( )s slog a g h V g= , 
for some strictly increasing function h. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
 Proof of Theorem 8 
 Note first that when choice probabilities are given as in Theorem 8, it follows readily that 
Axioms 2, 5 and 7 are satisfied. Note next that when Axiom 7 holds, if 
(A.4) ( ) ( )* *1 2 1 2P g ,g P g ,g= , 
then 
(A.5) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )* *1 3 2 3 1 3 2 3P g 1 g , g 1 g P g 1 g , g 1 gα + − α α + − α = α + − α α + − α , 
for * *1 2 1 2 3g , g , g , g , g S∈  and [ ]0,1α∈ . 
 To realize this, note that 
 ( ) ( )* *1 2 1 2P g ,g P g ,g=  
is equivalent to 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * *1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2P g ,g P g ,g and P g ,g P g ,g≥ ≤ . 
When applying Axiom 7 twice, with the inequality sign reversed the second time, we obtain (A.5). 
 Let ( )j jx V g , j 1,2,3= = , where V(⋅) is given as in Theorem 6. Then, as Axiom 7 implies 
Axiom 6, it follows that Theorem 6 holds. Accordingly, (4.2) yields 
(A.6) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )( )
1 3
1 3 2 3
2 3
h x 1 x
P g 1 g , g 1 g K
h x 1 x
⎛ ⎞α + − α
α + − α α + − α = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟α + − α⎝ ⎠
%
% % , 
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where K%  and h%  are defined by ( )K(x) K log x=%  and log h(x) h(x)=% , where h 0>%  is a strictly 
increasing function defined on R. 
 By (A.4), (A.5) and (A.6), we have that whenever *jx , given by ( )* *j jx V g= , 
*
jg S, j 1,2,∈ =  satisfies 
(A.7) ( )( )
( )
( )
*
11
*
2 2
h xh x
K K
h x h x
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎜ ⎟=⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
%%% %% % , 
then it follows that 
(A.8) 
( )( )
( )( )
( )( )
( )( )
*
1 31 3
*
2 3 2 3
h x 1 xh x 1 x
K K
h x 1 x h x 1 x
⎛ ⎞α + − α⎛ ⎞α + − α ⎜ ⎟=⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟α + − α α + − α⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
%%
% %% % , 
for any [ ]0,1α∈ . Without loss of generality, we normalize V such that when ( )0g 1,0,0,...= , 
( )0V g 0= . In particular, when 3 0g g= , then 3x 0= , and it follows from (A.7) and (A.8) that 
whenever *1x  and 
*
2x  are such that: 
(A.9) ( )( )
( )
( )
*
11
*
2 2
h xh x
h x h x
=
%%
% % , 
then 
(A.10) ( )( )
( )
( )
*
11
*
2 2
h xh x
h x h x
αα
=
α α
%%
% % , 
for all [ ]0,1α∈ . Next, note that (A.9) and (A.10) imply that we can write: 
(A.11) ( )( )
( )
( )
1 1
2 2
h x h x
f
h x h xα
⎛ ⎞α
= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟α ⎝ ⎠
% %
% % , 
for some strictly increasing continuous function fα  that depends on α. To realize this, observe that 
( ) ( )1 2h x h xα α% %  depends on 1 2x ,x  solely through ( ) ( )1 2h x h x% %  because (by (A.10)) the value of 
( ) ( )1 2h x h xα α% %  is unchanged when ( )1 2x ,x  is replaced by ( )* *1 2x ,x  when (A.9) is satisfied. 
 Let ( )1u h x= % , ( )21 v h x= % . From (A.11) we then get 
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(A.12) 
( ) ( )1
1
h h (u)
f uv .
1h h
v
−
α
−
α
=⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞
α ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
% %
% %
 
From (A.12), it follows that fα(z) is strictly increasing in z. 
 Without loss of generality, assume now that h%  is normalized such that for some g S∈ , 
( )h V(g) 1=% . This implies that u and v can attain the value one. By letting u and v successively be 
equal to one, (A.12) implies that 
(A.13) 1f (u) .
1f
u
α
α
= ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
Hence, by (A.12) and (A.13) 
(A.14) ( ) f (u)f uv f (u)f (v).
1f
v
α
α α α
α
= =⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
(A.14) is a functional equation of the Cauchy type. As fα(u) is strictly increasing, the only possible 
solution of (A.14) is given by 
(A.15) c( )f (u) u αα = , 
where c(α) is a function of α; see, for example, Falmagne (1985), Theorem 3.4. 
 Recall that h( )⋅%  is unique only up to a multiplicative constant. Therefore, h( )⋅%  can be 
normalized such that h(1) 1=% . From (A.11) and (A.15), with 1x x=  and 2x 1= , we obtain that: 
(A.16) ( )h x c( )h(x) h( )α = α + α , 
where h is defined on [0,1]. In the following, it will be convenient to organize the rest of the proof into 
two cases depending on whether or not c(α) is a constant. 
 
Case (i). c(α) is a constant. 
In this case (A.16) yields, by symmetry 
 ( ) ( )h x ch(x) h( ) h x ch( ) h(x)α = + α = α = α + , 
and hence 
 ( ) ( )c 1 h(x) c 1 h( )− = − α , 
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which must hold for all [ ]x, 0,1α∈ . This implies that c 1= . Thus, (A.16) reduces to a well-known 
Cauchy type functional equation. Then, necessarily 
(A.17) h(x) log x= β + γ , 
where β and γ are constants; see, for example, Falmagne (1985), Theorem 3.4. 
 
Case (ii). c(α) is not a constant. 
In this case, there is at least one α, say α0, such that ( )0c 1α ≠ . Hence, (A.16) leads to: 
(A.18) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 0 0 0 0h x c h(x) h h x c(x)h h(x)α = α + α = α = α + . 
The last equation yields 
(A.19) ( ) 0h(x) c(x) 1 b= − , 
where 
 
( )
( )
0
0
0
h
b
c 1
α
=
α −
. 
When (A.19) is inserted into (A.16) and the terms are rearranged, we obtain 
(A.20) ( )c x c( )c(x)α = α , 
for [ ], x 0,1α ∈ . The only strictly increasing solution of (A.20) is given by 
(A.21) c( ) κα = α , 
for some constant κ (see Falmagne, 1985, Theorem 3.4). When (A.19) and (A.21) are combined we 
get 
(A.22) ( )0h(x) b x 1κ= − , 
for [ ]x 0,1∈ . Note next that (A.7) and (A.8) imply that 
(A.23) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )* *1 3 2 3 1 3 2 3x 1 x x 1 x x 1 x x 1 xκ κκ κα + − α − α + − α = α + − α − α + − α , 
whenever 
(A.24) ( ) ( )* *1 2 1 2x x x x .κ κκ κ− = −  
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Now, keep * *1 2x , x  and x3 fixed and differentiate (A.23) with respect to x1 subject to (A.24). This gives 
(A.25) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
1
1 1 12 1
1 3 2 3 2 3
1 2
dx xx 1 x x 1 x x 1 x
dx x
κ−
κ− κ− κ− ⎛ ⎞
α + − α = α + − α = α + − α ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. 
Suppose that 1κ ≠ . Then, (A.25) implies that 1 2x x= , which is a contradiction. We therefore 
conclude that 1κ = , i.e., 
(A.26) ( )0h(x) b x 1= − . 
Recall that the normalization h(1) 0=  we adopted above was made purely for notational convenience 
so that the general form of h is 0h(x) b x= + γ , where γ is an arbitrary constant. 
 This completes the proof. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
 Proof of Corollary 2 
 As Axiom 7 implies Axiom 6, it follows from Theorem 7 that (4.4) must hold. Consider 
the special case with { }1 2B g ,g= . In this case, (4.4) reduces to a special case of (4.2) with 
 1K(x)
1 exp( x)
=
+ −
. 
Hence, Theorem 8 applies and implies (4.6). Without loss of generality, we can set 0κ =  and 1β =  
because κ cancels and β is absorbed in the utilities { }u(k)  in the expression for the choice probability. 
 Corollary 2 represents the most satisfactory model so far, in the sense that the choice 
probabilities are characterized completely in terms of a linear preference functional (4.1) of the 
respective lottery outcome probabilities. This is a rather strong result, and it is achieved at the cost of 
strong assumptions such as Axioms 3 and 7. In the special case with binary comparisons, i.e., 
{ }1 2B g ,g= , the Luce model is not particularly restrictive. Thus, in this case, Axiom 7 is the most 
objectionable assertion because it implies the Independence Axiom (Axiom 6).  
  Q.E.D. 
 
 Proof of Theorem 9 
 Note first that it follows immediately that when (i) or (ii) in Theorem 9 hold, then Axioms 
2, 5, 6 and 8 are true. We shall next prove that (i) or (ii) is also necessary. Without loss of generality, 
we consider lotteries with only two outcomes, that is, lottery j has outcome ( )j1, w  or (2,1) with 
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probabilities ( )j jg 1, w  and ( ) ( )j j jg 2,1 1 g 1, w= −  for j 1,2,3,4= , with 2 4g g= , 1w w=  and 3w a= , 
where a is a fixed positive number. 
 Let 
(A.27) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )j j j j j j j jV g u 1, w g 1, w u 2,1 g 2,1 g 1, w u 1, w u 2,1 u 2,1λ = λ + = λ − + , 
for j 1,2,3,4= , and 0λ > . Clearly, ( )jV gλ  is the expected utility of lottery j when j{g }λ  represents the 
outcome probabilities. From Axioms 2, 5 and 6, Theorem 6 follows, which yields 
(A.28) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )1 2 1 2P g ,g K h V g h V gλ λ λ λ= − , 
where K is a c.d.f. that is continuous and strictly increasing, and h is strictly increasing. Similarly to 
the proof of Theorem 8, it follows that Axiom 8 implies that if 
(A.29) ( ) ( )1 1 1 11 2 3 2P g ,g P g ,g= , 
then 
(A.30) ( ) ( )1 2 3 2P g ,g P g ,gλ λ λ λ= , 
for 0λ > . By (A.28), and because 2 4g g= , this is equivalent to the statement that if 
(A.31) ( ) ( )1 11 3V g V g= , 
then 
(A.32) ( ) ( )1 3V g V gλ λ= , 
for 0λ > . If (A.31) holds, then by (A.27) 
(A.33) 3
1
g (1,a) u(1, w) u(2,1)
g (1, w) u(1,a) u(2,1)
−
=
−
. 
Let 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )
u 1, x u 2,1
(x)
u 1,a u 2,1
−ψ =
−
 
and 
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 ( ) ( )( ) ( )
u 2, x u 2,1
k(x)
u 1,a u 2,1
−
=
−
. 
When (A.33) is inserted into (A.32), we obtain 
(A.34) ( ) ( )( )w k( ) (w) a k( )ψ λ = λ + ψ ψ λ − λ . 
(A.34) is a functional equation, the solution to which can be found in Falmagne (1985, p. 89) case 
(iv)). The solution is given by 
(A.35) w 1(w) c 1
ρ⎛ ⎞−ψ = +⎜ ⎟ρ⎝ ⎠
, 
and 
(A.36) ( ) ( )w 1k(w) a 1
ρ
−
= −
ρ
, 
where c and ρ are constants. Hence, it follows that 
(A.37) k k
w 1u(k, w) b c
ρ
−
= +
ρ
, 
for suitable constants, bk and ck. 
 Next, consider the functional form of h. Let jg , j 1,2,3,4= , represent four lotteries with 
binary outcomes ( )j1, w  and (1,1) with probabilities α and ( )1− α , respectively, for j 1,2,3,4= . 
 
Case (i): 0ρ ≠ . 
Write 
(A.38) ( ) ( ) ( )j j 1 1 2 2 jV g w d c 1 d 1 c zλ ρ ρ ρ= α λ + α + − α λ + − α = µ + γ , 
where ρµ = λ , ( )j 1 j 2z d w 1 dρ= α + − α  and ( )1 2c 1 cγ = α + − α , where d1, d2, c1 and c2 are constants. 
Let w1, w2, w3 and w4 be such that 
 ( ) ( )1 1 1 11 2 3 4P g ,g P g ,g≤ . 
Then, by Axiom 8 
 ( ) ( )1 2 3 4P g ,g P g ,gλ λ λ λ≤ . 
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An equivalent statement of Axiom 8 is that whenever 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 3 4K h z h z K h z h z≤% % % %% %  
then 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 3 4K h z h z K h z h zµ µ ≤ µ µ% % % %% % , 
for 0µ > , where ( )K(x) K log x=%  and ( )log h(x) h x= + γ% . We can now apply Theorem 14.19, in 
Falmagne (1985, p. 338), which yields 
(A.39) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 21 2 a z 1 a z 1K h z h z F
θ θ⎛ ⎞
− − −⎜ ⎟+ γ − + γ = ⎜ ⎟θ⎝ ⎠
, 
for some strictly increasing continuous function, F, where θ, a1 and a2 are independent of z1 and z2. By 
symmetry, one must have that 1 2a a= . Let 
1M(x) K F(ax)−= . Hence, (A.39) yields 
(A.40) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 21 2 a z 1 a z 1h z h z M
θ θ⎛ ⎞
− − −⎜ ⎟+ γ − + γ = ⎜ ⎟θ⎝ ⎠
. 
With 2z 1=  we get 
(A.41) ( ) ( ) ( )11 z 1h z h 1 M
θ⎛ ⎞
−⎜ ⎟+ γ = + γ + ⎜ ⎟θ⎝ ⎠
, 
and with 1z 1= , we get 
(A.42) ( ) ( ) ( )22 z 1h z h 1 M
θ⎛ ⎞
− −⎜ ⎟+ γ = + γ + ⎜ ⎟θ⎝ ⎠
. 
Let ( )j jx z 1θ= − θ . By subtracting (A.42) from (A.41), (A.40) follows, and we can express the 
resulting equation as 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2M x M x M x x− = − , 
or, setting 2x x=  and 1 2y x x= − , we obtain the equivalent equation 
(A.43) ( )M x y M(x) M(y)+ = + , 
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for x and y belonging to a suitable interval. As M is continuous, we must have that M(x) bx=  where 
b is a constant (see, for example, Falmagne, 1985, Theorem 2). Consequently, we obtain that 
(A.44) ( )z 1h(z)
θ
+ γ −
= β + κ
θ
, 
where θ, γ, κ and 0β >  are constants. Furthermore, we realize that both kc 0= γ = , because otherwise 
Axiom 8 will not hold. 
 It remains to prove that Axiom 8 implies that k1 c 0γ − ρ = =  for all k. To this end, 
consider four lotteries with outcomes { }kk, w  and lottery outcome probabilities jg , j 1,2,3,4= , such 
that 
(A.45) k j k 1k kc g (k) c g (k)=∑ ∑ , 
for k 2,3,4= . Let 
 j j k k
k
B g (k)b wρ= ρ∑ , 
and 
(A.46) k 1
k
1d c g (k)= γ − +
ρ ∑ . 
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 8, it follows that Axiom 8 implies that if 
(A.47) ( ) ( )1 1 1 11 2 3 4P g ,g P g ,g= , 
then 
(A.48) ( ) ( )1 2 3 4P g ,g P g ,gλ λ λ λ= , 
for 0λ > . If (A.44) holds with 0θ ≠  and 1θ ≠ , then (A.47) and (A.48) yield 
(A.49) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3 4B d B d B d B dθ θ θ θ+ λ − + λ = + λ − + λ . 
By dividing (A.48) by ( )2B d θ+ λ , we obtain 
(A.50) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 2 3 3C x r d 1 C x r d C x r dθ θ θ+ − = + − + , 
where 1 1 2C B B= , 2 3 2C B B= , 3 4 2C B B= , 1 1 2r 1 B B= − , 2 3 2r 1 B B= − , 3 4 2r 1 B B= −  and 
( )2x 1 d B= + λ , where 0 x 1 d< < . When differentiating (A.50) with respect to x, we obtain 
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(A.51) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 11 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3C x r d r d C x r d r d C x r d r dθ− θ− θ−+ = + − + . 
Now, divide (A.51) by ( ) 12 2C x r d θ−+ , which gives 
(A.52) ( ) ( )1 11 1 1 2 2 2 3D ys d r d r d D ys d r dθ− θ−+ = − + , 
where 1 1 2D C C= , 2 3 2D C C= , 1 1 2 1 2s r r C C= − , 2 3 2 3 2s r r C C= −  and ( )2 2y x C x r d= + , with 
( )2 20 y 1 C r d< < + . If we differentiate (A.52) with respect to y, we get 
(A.53) ( ) ( )2 22 21 1 1 1 2 2 3 2D ys d r s d D ys d r s dθ− θ−+ = + . 
Note that 
 1 1 4 41 1 3 2
3 2 3 2
B B B Br s 1 1 , r s 1 1
B B B B
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
= − − = − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
. 
Evidently, one can select lotteries such that B1 is different from B2 and B3, or B4 is different from B2 
and B3. This implies that either 1 1r s 0≠  or 3 2r s 0≠ . Consequently, (A.53) implies that d 0= . As d 
given in (A.46) must be zero for all choices of lottery outcome probabilities, { }1g (k) , and { }kc  are 
independent of { }1g (k) , we conclude that 1 0γ − ρ =  and kc 0=  for all k. 
 Next, consider the case with 1θ =  without the restriction in (A.45). Similarly to (A.49), 
we obtain that 
(A.54) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 3 4 3 4B B d d B B d d− + − λ = − + − λ , 
for 0λ > , where 
 j k j
k
d c g (k)=∑ , 
and given that (A.54) holds for 1λ = . Evidently, this implies that 1 2d d=  and 3 4d d= , which in 
general can happen only if kc c= . 
 
Case (ii): 0ρ = . 
In this case (A.35) yields 
(A.55) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
j 1 j 2 1 2
1 2 1 j 1 2
j
V g b log w 1 b log c 1 c
b 1 b log b log w c 1 c
log log z
λ
= α λ + − α λ + α + − α
= α + − α λ + α + α + − α
= µ +
, 
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where ( )( )1 2log b 1 b logµ = α + − α λ  and ( )j 1 j 1 2log z b log w c 1 c= α + α + − α . By Axiom 8, it follows 
that whenever 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )* * * *1 2 3 4K h z h z K h z h z≤% % , 
then 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )* * * *1 2 3 4K h z h z K h z h zµ µ ≤ µ µ% %  
for 0µ > , where ( )( )*h (x) exp h log x= . By Theorem 14.19 in Falmagne (1985, p. 338), we obtain 
that 
(A.56) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 21 2 a z 1 a z 1K h log z h log z F
θ θ⎛ ⎞
− − −⎜ ⎟
− = ⎜ ⎟θ⎝ ⎠
, 
for some strictly increasing and continuous function F where a1 and a2 are positive constants. Eq. 
(A.56) is completely analogous to (A.39), and it therefore follows in the same way as the analysis 
under Case (i) that 
 ( ) z 1h log z
θ⎛ ⎞−
= β + κ⎜ ⎟θ⎝ ⎠
, 
implying that 
 
( )xe 1
h(x)
θ
−
= β + κ
θ
, 
where θ, κ and 0β >  are constants. It follows readily that also in this case, kc c= , for all k. This 
completes the proof. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
 Proof of Corollary 3 
 Clearly, Axiom 9 implies Axiom 8. Therefore, by Theorem 8, it follows that Theorem 9 
must hold. Let 
 j j k
k
x bg (k) log w c= +∑ , 
for j = 1, 2, and consider the functional forms in (i) of Theorem 9. In this case, Axiom 9 implies that: 
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( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1 2
1 2
1 21 1
1 2
exp blog x exp blog x
h V g h V g
exp x exp x ,h V g h V g
λ λ β θ λ + − β θ λ +
− =
θ
β θ − β θ
= − =
θ
 
for 0λ > . The equation above implies that ( ) bexp b log 1θθ λ = λ = , which can only be true if 0θ = . 
The proof of (ii) is completely analogous. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
 Proof of Theorem 10 
 By applying a special case of Kolmogorov’s Theorem on the construction of random 
variables, the existence of the probability space on which the random field { }(g), g Sε ∈  is defined 
follows. See, for example, Billingsley (1995). This corollary establishes the desired results for the case 
that is relevant in our context, namely when ( )sg , s 1,2,...,ε =  are independent and identically 
distributed (i.i.d). The choice probability in (4.3) follows from a well-known result in discrete choice 
theory (see, for example, McFadden, 1984). The result now follows from Theorem 7. 
  Q.E.D. 
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